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Note
Amending Title VII to Safeguard the Viability of
Retaliation Claims
Brandon Wheeler*
From 1999 until 2009, Mischelle Richter worked as a store
1
manager at Advance Auto Parts, Inc. After reporting to her
supervisor that some of her coworkers were engaging in various
transgressions, the supervisor demoted Ms. Richter from the
2
store manager position. Four days after the demotion, Ms.
Richter filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
3
Commission (EEOC), alleging race and sex discrimination.
Seven days after filing the EEOC charge, Advance Auto Parts
4
terminated Ms. Richter. The EEOC eventually dismissed the
5
charge, and Ms. Richter filed a suit in federal district court.
However, instead of alleging the charges found within her original EEOC complaint, Ms. Richter alleged that Advance Auto
Parts had illegally retaliated against her for filing a charge, a
6
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Ms. Richter’s complaint for failure to ex7
haust administrative remedies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed
that holding, reasoning that a retaliation claim was an act “discrete” from the discriminatory actions complained of in an
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011,
University of Minnesota. Thank you to Professor Stephen Befort for his invaluable insight and guidance. Many thanks also to the board and staff of the
Minnesota Law Review for their help in publishing this piece and for the
pleasure of working together. Special thanks to Todd and Laura Wheeler for
their encouragement over the years, and to Vicky for her unwavering support.
Copyright © 2013 by Brandon Wheeler.
1. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 850.
5. Id. at 849.
6. Id. at 849–50.
7. Id. at 851.
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8

EEOC charge. Under the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, each
9
discrete act requires review by the EEOC.
While some circuits have held that post-EEOC-filing discriminatory acts are “discrete acts” and require an additional
10
EEOC charge, others have held that some post-EEOC-filing
discriminatory acts are “reasonably related” to the original
11
EEOC charge and do not require an additional EEOC charge.
The circuit split arose from the Supreme Court’s holding in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan that discrete discriminatory acts which preceded an EEOC charge by more than
300 days were barred by the statute of limitations, even if the
12
discriminatory acts were reasonably related. Courts have interpreted Morgan two different ways: (1) Morgan should be
read narrowly to apply only to pre-EEOC-charge discriminatory
acts; or (2) Morgan should be read broadly to apply to all dis13
criminatory acts that are “discrete acts.” Mrs. Richter’s case
exemplifies the problems with this circuit split and evidences
the growing administrative and procedural mess that is Title
VII litigation.
The Richter holding is particularly problematic because it
14
requires double litigation. It potentially leads to a logistical
nightmare in which a plaintiff must concurrently navigate both
the EEOC process and the civil litigation process while at the
same time ensuring that the stringent statute of limitations
8. Id. at 852–53.
9. Id. at 853.
10. See id. at 852; see also Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th
Cir. 2003).
11. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a retaliation claim was reasonably related to the EEOC charge
and therefore did not require a second EEOC charge to be filed).
12. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (“Each
incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision
constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ . . . [such
that a plaintiff] can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that ‘occurred’
within the appropriate time period.”).
13. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 858 (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. In a situation where the EEOC issued a right to sue letter for an initial act of discrimination, and the employee is subsequently retaliated against,
the employee will have an EEOC proceeding (for the retaliation) and a lawsuit
(for the initial discriminatory act) concurrently active. See id. at 859 (“Requiring prior resort to the EEOC would mean that two charges would have to be
filed in a retaliation case—a double filing that would serve no purpose except
to create additional procedural technicalities . . . .” (quoting Gupta v. E. Tex.
State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))).
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under Title VII is not violated. This Note argues that Title VII
should be amended to alleviate the unnecessary burden imposed by this new addition to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine. Part I examines the framework of Title VII
and its current treatment of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine regarding retaliation. Part II argues that
Richter and its companion decisions align logically with the
statute and precedent but cause unnecessary hardships and inequity. Part III proposes amending Title VII in order to exempt
post-charge retaliation from the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF TITLE VII AND THE
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
DOCTRINE
This Note will first explore the history and framework of
Title VII, including the EEOC’s procedural requirements in filing a charge and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. This Note
will then identify the important case law regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. Prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Morgan, most circuits were reluctant to enforce the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement to
retaliation claims. Following Morgan, however, circuits split
about how broadly to construe the requirement in retaliation
claims.
A. THE PURPOSE AND GOALS OF TITLE VII AND ITS ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION
Congress introduced Title VII as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 with the purpose of eliminating the effects of em16
ployment discrimination. Congress intended to draft Title VII
in such a way that it could provide individuals with effective
17
protection against discriminatory practices by employers. Ti-

15. An employee must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of
when the discriminatory act occurred; if the individual has filed a similar
complaint with a state human rights agency, the EEOC charge must be filed
within 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). After the EEOC has issued a
right to sue letter, an employee will only have 90 days to commence a civil suit
before that action is barred. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1) (2013).
16. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650 (1987).
17. See 110 CONG. REC. 1540 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay) (“This
bill is designed for the protection of individuals. When an individual is
wronged he can invoke the protection to himself, but if he is unable to do so
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tle VII purports to accomplish this by making it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to take an adverse employment action against an individual because of his or her
18
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. An “adverse em19
ployment action” includes a refusal to hire or a discharge. Title VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to segregate or
classify its employees in any way that would lead to an adverse
20
employment action. Finally, and most relevant to this Note,
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against
an employee for opposing an unlawful employment action (the
“opposition clause”) or for making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in a Title VII investigation
21
or proceeding (the “participation clause”). By banning retaliation against individuals who perform the types of duties found
in the participation clause, Congress intended to maintain “un22
fettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Without
protections from retaliation, employers who seek to deter Title
VII claims would have an incentive to fire employees who had
23
Title VII claims.
The “opposition clause” has been read narrowly to only in24
clude a complainant’s “active and purposive” conduct. In contrast, the protections of the “participation clause” have been
construed much more broadly, with the Second Circuit going so
far as to hold that defending oneself against charges of discrim25
ination is a protected activity under Title VII. For either type
of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case: (1)
she must show that she engaged in an activity protected by Tibecause of economic distress or because of fear then the Federal Government
is authorized to invoke that individual protection for that individual . . . .”).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
21. Id. § 2000e-3(a). For a general overview of the two different clauses,
see EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (11th Cir. 2000).
22. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
23. Id. at 345–46.
24. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 282 (2009).
25. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Merritt v.
Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that involuntary participation in a Title VII proceeding is protected from retaliation);
Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989) (stating that the “participation” clause is an exceptionally broad protection). But see also Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 267–68 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that the participation clause does not protect individuals who
file facially invalid claims).
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tle VII, (2) that the employer took an adverse employment action against her, and (3) that there was a causal connection be26
tween the two. Before a plaintiff can pursue any of the above
claims in federal court, however, she must satisfy certain procedural requirements.
B. EEOC FILING AND REVIEW OF THE CHARGE
Congress created the EEOC in order to oversee proceedings
27
arising under Title VII, among other tasks. When a discriminatory act occurs, the aggrieved employee must first file a
charge with the EEOC before she can sue in federal court, a
doctrine known generally as the exhaustion of administrative
28
remedies. The relevant provision states:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice
with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or
seek relief from such practice . . . within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days
after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated
the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earli29
er . . . .

This requirement encourages the settlement of discrimination
disputes through the EEOC’s processes instead of the courts, a
purpose which would be defeated if an individual could litigate
a claim not previously presented to and investigated by the
30
EEOC.
The EEOC has passed many regulations regarding how an
31
aggrieved employee should present a Title VII claim. On the
charge form provided by the EEOC, an employee must indicate
what they believe their discrimination is based on, and can
choose from the following options: race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, disability, retaliation, genetic information, or
32
other. The employee must also provide “[a] clear and concise
statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting

26. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006).
28. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Miller v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
31. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6–.12 (2013).
32. EEOC, CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION (FORM 5) (Nov. 2009), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/forms/upload/form_5.pdf.
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the alleged unlawful employment practices.” Within ten days
of the employee’s filing of the charge, the employer must be
34
served with notice of the charge.
Following receipt of the charge and notice to the adverse
parties, Title VII requires the EEOC to investigate the charge
35
in order to determine whether “reasonable cause” exists. Such
a finding represents an administrative determination of fact
that it is reasonable to believe that the discriminatory act oc36
curred. If the EEOC determines that reasonable cause exists,
then Title VII requires the EEOC to “endeavor to eliminate any
37
such alleged unlawful employment practice.” Such an endeavor includes the option for the EEOC to commence a civil case on
38
behalf of a claimant. This does not mean that Title VII re39
quires the EEOC to fully litigate the claim; alternatively, it
40
can resolve the issue through negotiated settlements. Howev41
er, as is nearly always the case, the EEOC may find that no
42
probable cause exists. If this is the case, then the EEOC will
usually not bring suit or attempt to reach a settlement on be33. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3). The specific contents of a charge are determined by EEOC regulations. See generally id. § 1601.6–.29.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
35. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC does not make a finding of cause or no
cause in all charges, as individuals can request their right-to-sue letter within
180 days regardless of where the EEOC is in the investigation. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28(a)(1).
36. EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 976 (N.D. Ill.
1981). Even if the EEOC finds that a discriminatory act occurred, it cannot be
used in subsequent proceedings without consent of the persons concerned. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27.
39. The EEOC is not required to bring suit on behalf of the aggrieved individual, even if it finds reasonable cause. See id. (“The Commission may bring
a civil action against any respondent named in a charge . . . .”) (emphasis added).
40. Id. § 1601.20; see also Definitions of Terms, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
definitions.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (explaining the EEOC’s role as a
party to negotiated settlements).
41. In 2011, the EEOC found reasonable cause in only 3.8 percent of all
Title VII cases (including charges filed concurrently under the ADA, ADEA,
and EPA). Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Title VII Charges, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Litigation Statistics]. The year 2001 had the highest percent of the past fifteen years, with
the EEOC finding reasonable cause in 9.2 percent of Title VII cases. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
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Instead, the EEOC will issue a right-to-

C. THE RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER
For a vast majority of aggrieved employees, the right-to45
sue letter comes following a finding of no probable cause. The
content of the right-to-sue letter includes the EEOC’s decision
and authorizes the aggrieved individual to bring a civil action
46
in federal court for violation of Title VII. Although the EEOC
47
retains the right to intervene in the lawsuit, as a practical
matter the EEOC has neither the time nor the resources to do
48
so. The right-to-sue letter requires the aggrieved individual to
49
bring their civil action within 90 days of its receipt. If she does
not bring the action within that statutory period, Title VII bars
50
her from bringing suit, absent equitable tolling. Equitable
tolling has been allowed, for example, if a claimant was tricked
51
into letting the deadline expire, or if the EEOC gave inade52
quate notice of the statute of limitations. Barring these equitable exceptions, the complainant must comply with the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.
43. Id. (“If the Commission determines after . . . investigation that there
is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the
charge.”). However, the EEOC reserves the right to offer assistance to individuals even after they have received their right-to-sue letter. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28(b)(4).
44. The EEOC can issue a right-to-sue letter in two different ways: either
by notice after 180 days of the filing of the charge or immediately following
disposition of the charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.
45. Over two-thirds of the nearly 83,000 resolutions in fiscal year 2011
were dispositions due to the EEOC finding no reasonable cause. Litigation
Statistics, supra note 41.
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e).
47. Id. § 1601.28(a)(4), (b)(4).
48. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF A NATIONAL CONTACT CENTER SOLUTION FOR EEOC (2003), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/9-8-03/center.html (“The EEOC is a
small, chronically understaffed agency.”).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
50. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (“[W]e
have held that the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private
employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.”).
51. See id. at 96 (“We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where
. . . the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct
into allowing the filing deadline to pass.”).
52. See Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267–68 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The
equitable tolling doctrine has been applied . . . when the EEOC’s notice of the
statutory period was clearly inadequate.”).
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D. THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
53

The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine gives
civil defendants an affirmative defense to claims arising under
54
Title VII. Under this doctrine, if a plaintiff does not fully exhaust all of her administrative remedies, a defendant would
55
succeed on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Courts have interpreted Title VII to mandate the exhaustion of
administrative remedies since the naissance of Title VII juris56
prudence. There are two general requirements that must be
fulfilled before a complainant has exhausted her administrative
remedies: (1) the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC, and
(2) receipt of a right-to-sue letter following the EEOC’s review
57
of the case. In order for a charge to be valid, it must be complete enough to allow the EEOC to have a fair opportunity to
58
investigate the claims found in the charge. If, for example, a
claimant solely alleges sex discrimination in the charge to the
EEOC but then attempts to sue for race discrimination, the
EEOC would not have had an opportunity to investigate the
race discrimination claim, and thus a court would find that the
claimant did not exhaust her administrative remedies with re-

53. See supra Part I.B (introducing the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine).
54. See Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In Title VII
actions, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense
in the nature of statute of limitations.”).
55. The Supreme Court has held that failures to comply with EEOC time
requirements are not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather a statutory requirement. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
56. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972) (“A person claiming
to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may
not maintain a suit for redress in federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of potential administrative relief.” (citation omitted)).
57. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970)).
58. A valid charge must: (1) be timely; (2) be in writing, signed, and verified; and (3) be “sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe
generally the action of practices complained of.” 2 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 26–57 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting 29
C.F.R. §§ 1601.9, 1601.12(b) (2013)). Beyond this minimum threshold, the
EEOC prefers, but does not require, charges to contain five components: (1)
the name and address of the employee making the charge; (2) the full name
and address of the employer; (3) a clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates; (4) the approximate number of persons employed by
the employer; and (5) information about any related proceedings in other state
or local agencies. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)).
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gard to that claim. However, certain types of claims were, prior to Morgan, excepted from this rule.
1. Pre-Morgan Treatment of the Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies Doctrine
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, most
courts allowed claims arising out of “continuing violations” to
escape the harshness of the exhaustion of administrative reme60
dies doctrine. “Continuing violations” could be both discrimi61
nation and retaliation claims. For example, some courts held
that retaliation claims following the filing of an EEOC charge
were “reasonably related to” and “growing out of” the original
discriminatory act, and therefore constituted “continuing viola62
tions.” If, however, the retaliatory act occurred before any
EEOC charge, complainants were required to include that re63
taliatory act in their EEOC charge.
59. Cf. Reynolds v. Solectron Global Servs., 358 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692–93
(W.D. Tenn. 2005) (holding that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a race discrimination claim because the claim was filed with the
EEOC after the complaint was filed with the court).
60. See Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he continuing violations doctrine, however, allows courts to
consider conduct that would ordinarily be time barred ‘as long as the untimely
incidents represent an ongoing unlawful employment practice.’” (quoting Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
536 U.S. 101 (2002).
61. See Oubichon v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.
1973) (“When an employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his
original charge to the EEOC, the judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the
EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge
before the EEOC.”).
62. See, e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[A] separate administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit complaining
about retaliation for filing the first charge.”), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Luevano v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 864 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that
when a plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for filing an EEOC
charge, she is not required to file another EEOC complaint); Kirkland v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 622 F.2d 1066, 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that when a
plaintiff sued for retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, “a second authorization to sue was not required”).
63. See, e.g., Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 545 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“These cases [that held that retaliation arose after the charge had
been filed] are distinguishable from the present case where the alleged retaliatory acts occurred before [the plaintiff’s] . . . charge of discrimination was filed
and [the employer] was not given clear notice that retaliation was at issue.”).
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Retaliation claims were given special protection for several
reasons. Some courts insisted that the initial filing in such a
64
situation satisfied Title VII’s intent. Others reasoned that
public policy encourages the punishment of retaliatory ac65
tions. Still other courts argued that notice is an essential purpose of requiring an EEOC claim, not adjudication, and that
the EEOC’s first review of the claim puts an employer on notice
66
for all reasonably related claims that follow. Regardless of
their rationales, circuits unanimously held prior to Morgan
that a post-charge retaliatory action was a “continuing viola67
tion” that did not necessitate an additional charge.
2. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan drastically
changed the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
under Title VII. The facts of Morgan are relatively simple.
Morgan, a black male, filed discrimination and retaliation
68
charges with the EEOC against his employer. In the EEOC
charge, Morgan alleged acts that occurred within the past 300
69
days, but he also alleged acts that occurred prior to that time
70
period. The employer was successful in a motion for summary
judgment in regards to all incidents that predated the 300-day
71
mark. The Ninth Circuit reversed, citing the continuing viola64. See Gottlieb v. Tulane Univ., 809 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Requiring [a plaintiff] to resort to the EEOC a second time on a retaliation claim
would serve no purpose ‘except to create additional procedural technicalities
when a single filing would comply with the intent of Title VII.’” (quoting Gupta
v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))).
65. See Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312 (“[H]aving once been retaliated
against for filing an administrative charge, the plaintiff will naturally be gun
shy about inviting further retaliation by filing a second charge complaining
about the first retaliation.”).
66. See EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hosp., 664 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1981) (“A
reasonable cause determination is not to adjudicate a claim but to notify an
employer of the Commission’s findings. There is no requirement that the
agency begin its investigation anew on discovering a reasonably related theory
of liability.” (citation omitted)).
67. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (“All other circuits that have considered the issue have determined that a plaintiff may
raise the retaliation claim for the first time in federal court. On consideration,
we . . . adopt this position.”).
68. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
69. According to Title VII, a charge must be filed within 300 days after
the unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
70. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
71. Id.
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tions doctrine. National Railroad petitioned, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine, among other issues, the
73
scope of the continuing violations doctrine.
The Supreme Court distinguished between hostile envi74
ronment claims and discrete acts. It recognized that acts occurring outside the 300-day period could be part of a hostile en75
vironment claim. A hostile environment claim is one that by
its very nature involves a series of separate acts that collectively constitute an unlawful employment practice, such as an em76
ployer continuously calling its employee racial epithets. The
Court, however, ultimately reversed in favor of the employer on
the issue of continuing violations in non-hostile environment
77
claims. It examined the statutory language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1): “A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful em78
ployment practice occurred.” The Court found that “[t]here is
simply no indication that the term ‘practice’ converts related
discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of
79
timely filing.” The Court explicitly overruled the Court of Appeal’s application of the continuing violations doctrine to acts
that are “sufficiently related,” instead labeling such acts as dis80
crete acts. The Supreme Court explained its definition of discrete acts within the meaning of the statute: “Discrete acts
such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or
refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision consti81
tutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’”
In effect, this holding requires complainants to file any complaint based on a discrete act within the 180- or 300-day period
after the act occurred. A complainant may include multiple dis-

72. Id. at 106–07.
73. Id. at 108.
74. Id. at 115.
75. Id. at 118 (“The statute does not separate individual acts that are part
of the hostile environment claim from the whole for the purposes of timely filing and liability.”).
76. Id. at 117 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)).
77. Id. at 113–14.
78. Id. at 109.
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id. at 114.
81. Id.
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crete acts in her charge, but if the discrete acts are more than
82
300 days apart, they require separate charges.
3. The Post-Morgan Circuit Split
The discrete acts doctrine implemented by the Supreme
Court quickly led to a circuit split about whether Morgan
should apply to post-EEOC filing discriminatory acts, particularly retaliation. In Martinez v. Potter, the Tenth Circuit held
83
that the rule was equally applicable to post-EEOC filing acts.
The Martinez Court firmly held that “Morgan abrogates the
continuing violation doctrine as previously applied to claims of
discriminatory or retaliatory actions by employers, and replaces it with the teaching that each discrete incident of such
treatment constitutes its own ‘unlawful employment practice’
84
for which administrative remedies must be exhausted.” In addition, the Martinez Court reasoned that an employer should be
on notice of the specific violation prior to a lawsuit in order to
“facilitate internal resolution of the issue rather than promot85
ing costly and time-consuming litigation.”
In Richter, the Eighth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s
holding. It reasoned that Title VII’s use of the word “the” in de86
scribing unlawful employment practices showed that the “the
complainant must file a charge with respect to each alleged un87
lawful employment practice.” The Richter Court determined
that Morgan had effectively changed the continuing violations
doctrine to the extent that it applied to post-EEOC filing dis88
criminatory acts, including retaliation. The court read Morgan
as an admonishment to the circuits to follow statutory text, and
interpreted the term “practice” similarly, holding that “[t]he
term ‘practice’ no more subsumes multiple discrete acts when
one of those acts occurs after the filing of an EEOC charge than
89
it does when all acts occur before the charge is filed.” A vivid
82. Id. at 113.
83. Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2003).
84. Id. at 1210.
85. Id. at 1211.
86. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (“Title VII requires that a complainant must file a charge with
the EEOC within 180 days ‘after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred,’ and give notice to the employer of the circumstances of ‘the alleged
unlawful employment practice.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006))).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 852.
89. Id.
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dissent argued that policy considerations supported an exception for post-filing retaliation claims from the requirement of
90
exhaustion of administrative remedies, but the majority found
91
that different policies, as well as the statute itself overrode
92
those policy considerations.
The Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, held contrary
to the Tenth Circuit, that retaliation for an EEOC filing does
93
not require a second filing. The Sixth Circuit made a distinction between the old continuing violations doctrine and retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, arguing that retaliation for an
EEOC filing was never part of the continuing violations doc94
trine to begin with. In doing so, it held that Morgan was not
95
applicable to certain retaliatory acts.
The Fourth Circuit, in Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., also
held contrary to the Tenth Circuit. The Jones Court reasoned
that Morgan only applied to discriminatory acts for the purpos96
es of starting the statute of limitations. The Jones Court distinguished Morgan by stating: “[Morgan] does not purport to
address the extent to which an EEOC charge satisfies exhaus97
tion requirements for claims of related, post-charge events.”
As opposed to the Sixth Circuit, the Jones Court argued that
the continuing violations doctrine survived in post-charge dis98
criminatory actions. The court therefore held that its preMorgan precedent survived to the extent that it related to postcharge discriminatory acts, and that retaliation for an EEOC

90. Id. at 859 (“In concluding a plaintiff should not be required to file a
new EEOC charge for retaliation claims arising after the filing, the Fifth Circuit, for example, emphasized the needless procedural barrier a contrary rule
would require.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eberle v. Gonzales,
240 F. App’x 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2007))).
91. Id. at 853 (“Exempting retaliation claims from the administrative
framework established by Congress could frustrate the conciliation process,
which we have called ‘central to Title VII’s statutory scheme.’” (quoting Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994))).
92. Id.
93. Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep’t, 94 F. App’x 247, 254 (6th Cir.
2004).
94. Id. at 253.
95. Id. (“Plaintiff before us is not looking to raise the issue of retaliatory
acts that may have occurred prior to his filing of his EEOC claim that are
statutorily time-barred. That was the issue in Morgan, and hence Morgan’s
holding.”).
96. Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2009).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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charge is thus still exempted from the exhaustion require99
ment.
The Eleventh and Second Circuits have both maintained
their pre-Morgan precedents and held that a plaintiff is not required to bring a second EEOC charge for retaliation. Both cir100
cuits did so without even so much as a reference to Morgan.
The EEOC has taken the position that post-charge discriminatory acts such as retaliation do not warrant the filing of a
101
second charge.
It adopted this position in its Compliance
Manual after seeing the circuit split that arose out of Mor102
gan. In the manual, the EEOC argues that Morgan should be
103
read narrowly to not apply to post-charge discriminatory acts.
However, courts have held that the Compliance Manual does
104
not determine the rights of parties, but instead serves merely
105
as an internal guideline for the agency, or at most a body of

99. Id.
100. Perhaps a reason that the Second Circuit did not discuss Morgan was
because the defendant never argued in its appellate brief that Morgan overruled the precedent; instead, the defendant merely tried to distinguish its case
from the precedent on the facts. The appellate briefs in Thomas v. Miami Dade
Public Health Trust, however, gave the Eleventh Circuit ample opportunity to
consider the impact of Morgan; but the court opted to write a short, unpublished opinion that did not reference Morgan. See Thomas v. Miami Dade
Pub. Health Trust, 369 F. App’x 19, 23 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is unnecessary
for a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies prior to urging a retaliation
claim growing out of an earlier charge . . . .” (quoting Gupta v. E. Tex. State
Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))); Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 151
(2d Cir. 2003) (finding that a second charge is not required “where the complaint is ‘one alleging retaliation by an employer against an employee for filing
an EEOC charge’” (quoting Butts v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev.,
990 F.2d 1397, 1402–03 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Carter v. New
Venture Gear, Inc., 310 F. App’x 454, 458 (2d Cir. 2009))).
101. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL
SECTION 2: THRESHOLD ISSUES § 2-IV(C)(1)(a) (2009) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 2], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
threshold.html#2-IV-C-1-a (“A timely charge also may challenge related incidents that occur after the charge is filed.”).
102. See Compliance Manual, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/compliance.cfm (last visited Nov. 4,
2013).
103. See COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 2, supra note 101, at n.185 (“Nothing in Morgan suggests that a new charge must be filed when a charge challenging related acts already exists.”).
104. Hall v. EEOC, 456 F. Supp. 695, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
105. Sunbeam Appliance Co. v. Kelly, 532 F. Supp. 96, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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experience to which a court may resort to for guidance. Despite the EEOC’s definitive opinion on the matter, the Tenth
and Eighth Circuits still hold that a post-charge retaliatory act
must be included in an EEOC charge in order to fully exhaust
administrative remedies, leaving complainants in the undesirable position of re-navigating the lengthy EEOC process while
simultaneously pursuing a claim in federal court.
II. THE STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL MERITS
OF A STRICT READING OF TITLE VII AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
Richter and Martinez provide a proper interpretation of Title VII and Morgan: all claims of retaliation must be submitted
to the EEOC for review before they can be litigated in federal
court in order to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. However, this proper interpretation is detrimental to Title VII claimants because it significantly hinders
the viability of retaliation claims. In this part, this Note will
first examine the statutory language of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s holdings in Morgan. Then, it will analyze the
consequences of the proper interpretation for the viability of retaliation claims, as well as the implications for employers and
employees in future Title VII litigation.
A. INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII AND MORGAN
1. Statutory Language of Title VII
When interpreting a statute, a court will first look to the
107
plain meaning of the statute to determine if it is ambiguous.
Looking at the three key words (“shall,” “practice,” and “the”) in
the context of the entirety of § 2000e-5(e), it is clear that the
plain language of the statute mandates the filing of an additional charge for post-charge retaliation. Even if this results in
unfair outcomes, the Supreme Court has noted that “strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legisla-

106. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9
(2003).
107. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997); see also Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there.”).
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ture is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the
108
law.”
The relevant language of Title VII states: “A charge under
this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice oc109
curred . . . .” This charge must be filed with the EEOC or the
110
appropriate state or local agency. It is unambiguous that
111
some kind of charge must be filed with the EEOC, as the
112
statute’s usage of “shall” mandates. Rather, courts differ on
the definition of the term “unlawful employment practice.”
In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, courts
will look to common usage of the term, such as a dictionary def113
inition. Although Title VII does not include the term “unlaw114
ful employment practice” in its list of definitions, it does define the term in §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3. Title VII partially
defines, through examples, an “unlawful employment practice”
as the (1) failure or refusal to hire or discharge any individual,
(2) the limitation, segregation, or classification of an employee
that would adversely affect her status as an employee, and (3)
retaliation for opposing a practice or participating in a Title VII
115
proceeding. Some of these definitions allow for a more expansive interpretation of “unlawful employment practice” than
others. For instance, a discharge is an unlawful employment
practice that is easily temporally defined; it is usually a singu116
lar event. On the other hand, segregation of employees is an
108. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
110. See id. § 2000e-5 (establishing the framework of the EEOC filing process).
111. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (“[Title
VII] specifies with precision the jurisdictional prerequisites that an individual
must satisfy before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit. In the present case,
these prerequisites were met when petitioner (1) filed timely a charge of employment discrimination with the Commission, and (2) received and acted upon the Commission’s statutory notice of the right to sue.”).
112. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 35 (1998).
113. CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2001).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
115. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a).
116. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114
(2002) (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.”); Int’l Union of Elec. Workers v.
Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1976) (holding that a discharge
was final rather than tentative). Even in more difficult cases, such as those
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unlawful employment practice that by its nature can extend
117
over days, months, or even years. Because a singular unlawful employment practice like segregation extends over such a
lengthy period of time, one could argue that Congress did not
intend for the term “practice” to limit an act to a singular concrete event for the purpose of determining when the statute of
limitations starts running. Rather, it would support a preMorgan or Jones interpretation that allowed “reasonably related” acts to constitute a singular unlawful employment practice.
Proponents of the Jones holding might argue that congressional use of “practice” instead of a term such as “act” indicates
that Congress intended for “practice” to be defined by its ordinary usage, not by the statutory examples. Ordinary usage of
“practice” would be “the customary, habitual, or expected pro118
cedure or way of doing something.” This definition implies a
continuing act rather than a discrete act. However, in defining
an “unlawful employment practice” Congress provided exam119
ples such as retaliation and segregation. Segregation is generally a continuing event, but retaliation can consist of a singular event, such as a discharge. Because both singular and
continuing events are considered “unlawful employment practices,” the term cannot be confined to a simple dictionary definition. Instead, Morgan’s differentiation between discrete acts
and continuing violations logically divides the different types of
120
practices based on their temporal attributes.
Title VII’s usage of “the” in “the alleged employment practice” is also instructive. Title VII mandates that a charge must
involving a constructive discharge, there is still a singular event that defines
the ultimate discharge. See Martin W. O’Toole, Note, Choosing a Standard for
Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 594
(1986) (discussing Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140
(5th Cir. 1975), in which the court held an employee’s resignation constituted
a constructive discharge).
117. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (“Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.”).
For a discussion of segregation in the workforce and the amount of time and
number of employees it can encompass, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 621, 634 (1987).
118. Definition of Practice, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2013), http://
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/practice?q=practice.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
120. Morgan stated that “[Title VII] explains in great detail the sorts of actions that qualify as ‘[u]nlawful employment practices’ and includes among
such practices numerous discrete acts.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111. The Morgan
Court distinguishes between such discrete acts and hostile environment
claims involving “repeated conduct” and a “cumulative effect.” Id. at 114–15.
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be filed within 180 or 300 days after the alleged employment
121
practice occurred. The Richter court found its usage persua122
sive because “the” is a definite article. The usage of “the” indicates that a charge must be filed for each discriminatory
123
practice. If Congress had used “an,” for example, it would
seem that a complainant would only have to file a charge relating to one discriminatory practice in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirements.
2. Interpretations of Morgan
While Morgan, Richter, and Martinez all recognize that the
plain meaning of the statute mandates the filing of an additional charge for post-charge retaliation, Jones not only ignores
124
the language of the statute but also dismisses the obvious interpretation of Morgan. In Jones, the Fourth Circuit justified
its holding by reading Morgan very narrowly to apply only
when the “limitations clock . . . begins ticking” with regard to
125
discrete acts.
The Jones Court determined that Morgan
126
therefore did not overrule its pre-Morgan jurisprudence,
which had held that post-charge discriminatory acts did not re127
quire a second filing. However, this narrow reading of Morgan is erroneous.
While it is true that Morgan did not directly contemplate a
post-charge discriminatory act in its analysis, it was critical of
the breadth of the continuing violations doctrine, stating,
“There is simply no indication that the term ‘practice’ converts
related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the pur128
poses of timely filing.” It also reversed the Court of Appeals’
holding that acts that are sufficiently related to the original act
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
122. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam).
123. Id.
124. Jones v. Calvert Grp. Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 301–04 (4th Cir. 2009). In
contrast, the Supreme Court in Mohasco rejected ignorance of statutory language as a reason for overlooking the statute’s plain meaning and refused to
adopt a less literal reading of the statute, regardless of an unfair result in the
case. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 824–26 (1980). Richter also noted
that “[t]he overriding message of Morgan was to follow statutory text.” 686
F.3d at 852.
125. Jones, 551 F.3d at 303.
126. Id. at 303–04.
127. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that “a
plaintiff may raise the retaliation claim for the first time in federal court”).
128. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111.
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are not required to fall within the charge filing period. Ultimately, the Morgan Court limited the continuing violations
doctrine as it applies to all discrete acts, regardless of how
130
closely related they are to another discrete act.
Even given the commands of Morgan to follow the statutory text and to limit the continuing violations doctrine, the
Jones Court largely dismissed Morgan, holding that Morgan
131
only applies to pre-charge discriminatory acts.
The Jones
Court did this because a narrow reading of Morgan was the only way to reach its desired conclusion. Under a broader reading
of Morgan, the Jones Court would have to argue that postcharge retaliation is not a discrete, singular act. This argument
fails because common retaliatory acts such as discharge or refusal to promote by their very nature may require only one sin132
gle act to occur. Under a broad reading, it does not matter
that the retaliatory discharge is “related” to an earlier discrim133
inatory act; Morgan explicitly rejected the argument that related discrete acts can be converted into an “ongoing violation
134
that can endure or recur over a period of time.” Especially in
conjunction with the plain meaning of Title VII, Morgan should
be read broadly to require EEOC review of post-charge retaliation. However, many negative consequences arise as a result of
this reading.
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A STRICT READING OF TITLE VII AND
A BROAD READING OF MORGAN
Retaliation following an initial EEOC charge is a type of
discrimination distinct from most of the employment practices
made unlawful by Title VII, and implicates conflicting goals of
Title VII. In circuits that follow the strict statutory text of Title
129. Id. at 113; see Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 232 F.3d 1008,
1015 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
130. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.
131. The Jones Court’s discussion of Morgan took up less than one page of
text. Jones, 551 F.3d at 303.
132. For a discharge, there is a single discriminatory event: the employee is
fired from employment. In contrast, a hostile environment claim usually includes a series of acts: the very nature of this type of claim is the “cumulative
effect of individual acts.” Luciano v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
308, 318 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115).
133. “Relatedness” was the very basis of the continuing violation doctrine:
it allowed a claim to survive the statute of limitations if a plaintiff showed
that there were a series of related acts, one of which fell within the 180-day
period. Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983).
134. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110–11.
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VII, employers have gained certain advantages. However, serious negative consequences exist that damage an employee’s opportunity to pursue all of her claims.
1. Retaliation Claims and Conflicting Goals of Title VII
A post-charge retaliation claim possesses unique qualities
that differentiate it from other unlawful employment practices
covered by Title VII. Before a claim for post-charge retaliation
135
can arise, an original EEOC claim must have been filed. By a
strict reading of Title VII and a broad reading of Morgan, an
individual must file a second claim and receive a right-to-sue
136
letter before she can sue for retaliation.
The anti-retaliation provision by its very nature prohibits
discrimination by enforcing fair procedure, not by directly ban137
ning discrimination. It does this through “[m]aintaining un138
fettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” This concern implicates two conflicting purposes of Title VII. First,
courts have read Title VII’s creation of the EEOC to encourage
employers and employees to engage in conciliation efforts be139
fore coming to federal court. Further, Congress strengthened
conciliatory efforts in 1972 by giving the EEOC the power to
140
commence civil suits if voluntary compliance failed. The filing

135. See Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (“It
is the nature of retaliation claims that they arise after the filing of the EEOC
charge.”).
136. See id. (“Requiring prior resort to the EEOC would mean that two
charges would have to be filed in a retaliation case . . . .”).
137. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006)
(“The antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are
not discriminated against because of their status, while the antiretaliation
provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an employee’s
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”).
138. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
139. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (“Exempting retaliation claims from the administrative
framework established by Congress could frustrate the conciliation process,
which we have called ‘central to Title VII’s statutory scheme.’” (quoting Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994))).
140. Many civil rights groups in the 1960s referred to the EEOC as a
“toothless tiger” because of its lack of an enforcement mechanism. 1965–1971:
A “Toothless Tiger” Helps Shape the Law and Educate the Public, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965
-71/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358–66 (1977) (discussing the legislative history of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which gave the EEOC additional enforcement powers); Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still)
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of the charge itself also serves conciliatory purposes, as it puts
the employer on notice of the claim so that it can commence in141
ternal resolution of the issue. This conciliatory purpose is
clearly satisfied by a strict reading of Title VII, as it gives the
EEOC the opportunity to review and conciliate all retaliatory
142
acts.
The second purpose implicated by post-charge retaliation is
reducing discrimination in general. The EEOC relies heavily on
the availability of private lawsuits in order to reduce discrimi143
nation; in 2011, 31.4 percent of charges filed under Title VII
144
with the EEOC contained a claim of retaliation. Without a
robust anti-retaliation mechanism, it would be difficult to effectively combat discrimination in the workplace, as employees
145
would be hesitant to file charges against their employers.
While it is clear that a strong anti-retaliation provision is necessary to reduce discrimination, a more in-depth examination
of the implications for employers and employees is needed in
order to see how a strict reading of Title VII results in a weakening of the provision.
2. Implications for Employers
At first it may appear as if a strict reading of Title VII is
beneficial to an employer. It might allow employers to more efMatters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 688–89 (2005) (noting that in 1996
the EEOC recovered $169.2 million from conciliation and settlement efforts).
141. See Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (“First,
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies serves to put an employer on
notice of a violation prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings. This in
turn serves to facilitate internal resolution of the issue rather than promoting
costly and time-consuming litigation.”).
142. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 853; see also supra note 139.
143. See Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981)
(“We are reluctant to erect a needless procedural barrier to the private claimant under Title VII, especially since the EEOC relies largely upon the private
lawsuit to obtain the goals of Title VII.”); Litigation Statistics, supra note 41
(showing that in Fiscal Year 2011, 66.7 percent of cases were found to have no
reasonable cause, meaning that the EEOC did not successfully conciliate or
settle the case, nor did it commence a lawsuit on behalf of the employee).
144. Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Charge Statistics, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
145. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)
(“Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who
are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses. . . . Interpreting the
antiretaliation provision to provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.” (citation omitted)).
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ficiently retaliate against employees who file charges with the
146
EEOC. Or, to phrase it less cynically, it may cut down on the
number of retaliation claims brought before the EEOC because
an employee may be deterred by the extra time and money it
147
would cost to navigate the EEOC process a second time.
Could a strict reading of Title VII actually be bad for employers? Some might argue that a second EEOC charge would
148
increase litigation costs. Additionally, although an employer
would certainly not want to see a second retaliation claim in
federal court, barring the retaliation claim would not affect the
viability of the other claims already reviewed by the EEOC.
However, employers are more likely to have the resources to
149
withstand a lengthy and expensive litigation process. There
could also be cost savings if employers were able to more efficiently retaliate against employees because it could cut down
on the number of charges or lawsuits brought, as employees either might not understand the complexities of a double filing,
or might be unwilling to take on the costs and risks of a second
150
filing. Ultimately, a strict reading of Title VII is more advantageous than not for employers.
146. Cf. Gupta, 654 F.2d at 414 (“Eliminating this needless procedural barrier will deter employers from attempting to discourage employees from exercising their rights under Title VII.”).
147. See id.; Nat’l Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp.
1338, 1344 (D. Conn. 1978) (noting that requiring a second charge with the
EEOC for a retaliation claim erects “another procedural barrier to a Title VII
suit”).
148. According to the EEOC, it took an average of six months to investigate
a charge in 2004. The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013). The addition of a second charge and investigation could add
upwards of six months more onto the dispute. However, a second investigation
may not be nearly as lengthy, as the EEOC would have uncovered much of the
pertinent information already. See Clockedile v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 245 F.3d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Further, the EEOC has appeared as amicus curae, advising us that . . . it is ‘likely’ that the alleged retaliation against Clockedile for
filing her charge would ‘have been uncovered in a reasonable EEOC investigation’ of the charge.”).
149. Some of the concerns about financial burdens for plaintiffs are alleviated by the fact that an employee who prevails in a Title VII dispute can collect attorney’s fees, economic damages, non-economic damages, and punitive
damages. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV.
782, 799–800 (2011) (discussing the damages available in Title VII suits).
However, this does not necessarily resolve whether litigation costs may dissuade aggrieved employees from filing suit, as the prospect of years of litigation for a mere chance at receiving damages may scare off some individuals
with shakier claims or evidence. See id. at 790.
150. Of course, the procedural barriers of a second filing are not so great
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3. Implications for Employees
The first problem for employees under a strict reading of
Title VII is that it confuses even further the already complex
151
statute of limitations scheme. Without a strict reading, a
normal case might look like this: an employer refuses to promote a female due to her gender. The employee then must file
152
her claim with the EEOC within 180 days. If the employer retaliates against the employee at any time after the filing of the
charge, pre-Morgan a court would have considered the acts
153
substantially related and not require an additional charge.
Then, the only other EEOC requirement the employee would
deal with is ensuring that she filed her lawsuit within ninety
154
days after receiving the right-to-sue letter.
However, if a court follows the strict reading of Title VII,
the statute of limitations is not as clear. If the employer immediately retaliated against the employee for filing the claim, the
employee may have a chance to amend her EEOC charge, or
155
could instead opt to file an additional charge. Either way, the
employee would have to file the amendment or new charge with
the EEOC within 180 days of the retaliation in order to be con156
sidered timely. If there were two concurrent charges, the emthat an employee would refuse to take on the difficulty and costs of pursuing
the second claim if the employer obviously retaliated. Cf. id. at 797 n.64 (discussing how plaintiffs are most likely to sue when optimistic about their success). However, employers rarely leave direct evidence of discrimination, leaving employees with the arduous task of proving intent through indirect
evidence. See Ann C. McGinley, !Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 448–66 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of proving intent through indirect evidence after recent Supreme Court decisions).
151. See Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 507 (2010) (“The [EEOC] scheme obviously has
pitfalls in plenty for the potential plaintiff . . . . It is fair to say that the run-up
to a Title VII suit is a procedural minefield, which is especially unfortunate
given that the structure is designed to be initiated by individuals without the
assistance of private attorneys.”).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). The situation becomes even more
complex when a state enforcement agency is involved. In that situation, the
employee must comply with the state statute’s time limitations, and must file
with the EEOC within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice or within thirty days after termination of the proceedings by the state agency. Id.
153. See supra Part I.D.1.
154. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1) (2013).
155. The regulations require an amendment alleging additional acts which
constitute unlawful employment practices to be related to or growing out of
the subject matter of the original charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

798

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:775

ployee would have to make sure that she filed her lawsuit with157
in ninety days of receipt of each right-to-sue letter, and then
158
either pursue both lawsuits separately or seek a joinder. If
the employer waited to retaliate until the EEOC issued the initial right-to-sue letter and the employee filed suit, the employee
159
would be required to file a new EEOC charge, and would then
be tasked with simultaneously navigating the EEOC process a
160
second time and pursuing a claim in federal court. Even with
the added complexity to the process, an employee should be
able to navigate a double filing with the assistance of competent counsel. However, not only is it possible for an employee to
initially navigate the EEOC process without the assistance of
161
162
counsel, it is very common. Ultimately, the confusions and
strict deadlines resulting from the above EEOC process make it
inevitable that some employees will have their retaliation
163
claims barred by the statute of limitations.
In addition to the daunting EEOC procedures, other factors
may dissuade an employee from filing a second EEOC claim for
retaliation. First, an employee may feel as if a second EEOC fil164
ing would be useless. If the first EEOC charge resulted in a
157. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1).
158. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff to join as many
claims as she has against an opposing party. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
159. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir.
2012) (per curiam).
160. See id. at 859 (Bye, J., dissenting) (discussing the negative policy implications of requiring a double filing).
161. For example, the EEOC publicly states on its website that a complainant does not need to be represented by an attorney in order to file a discrimination complaint. Youth at Work FAQ, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/youth/filingfaq.html#Q2 (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
162. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972) (calling a particularly worrisome procedural technicality in Title VII “inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process”); see also Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431, 482 (1996) (examining EEOC proceedings under the
ADA, and determining that “in many cases, the employer will be represented
by legal counsel while the employee will not”).
163. See Michael Lee Wright, Time Limitations for Civil Rights Claims:
Continuing Violation Doctrine, 71 TENN. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (2004) (discussing confusing case law regarding time-barred discrimination claims and how
employees may fail to timely file).
164. See Butts v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397,
1402 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Due to the very nature of retaliation, the principle benefits of EEOC involvement, mediation of claims and conciliation, are much less
likely to result from a second investigation.”), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
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federal lawsuit, it is apparent that the EEOC’s conciliatory efforts did not work for the first charge, and would likely not
165
work for a second charge either. Additionally, an employee
may feel as if she wants to pursue the retaliation claim, but is
afraid of the employer retaliating again for the filing of a
charge, which in turn would necessitate another EEOC
166
charge. And, of course, there are time and money costs associated with a second EEOC filing and a second lawsuit that
may deter employees or their lawyers from pursuing a retalia167
tion claim.
It is not as if these concerns about an employee’s rights are
new; many of these policy arguments were made in pre-Morgan
168
cases when the continuing violations doctrine was the norm.
However, Morgan and the statutory language of Title VII make
it clear that the EEOC has mandatory review of all claims arising under Title VII, and thus that a post-charge retaliatory act
169
necessitates a second filing. Given how this proper reading
affects the viability of a post-charge retaliation claim, it is evident that Title VII must be amended in order to ensure the viability of retaliation claims.
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Carter v. New
Venture Gear, Inc., 310 F. App’x 454, 458 (2d Cir. 2009).
165. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“Addressing the facts of [Nealon], we reasoned that . . . because conciliation
with the [employer] had not improved [the employee’s] position following the
first EEOC charge, it would not have been likely to do so had she filed a second charge.” (citing Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992))).
166. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[H]aving once been retaliated against for filing an administrative charge, the
plaintiff will naturally be gun shy about inviting further retaliation by filing a
second charge complaining about the first retaliation.”), superseded by statute
on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in
Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013).
167. In an hourly fee billing arrangement, a client may pressure their attorney to not file a second claim because of the additional hours that would
have to be billed. Conversely, in a contingency-fee billing arrangement, an
employee’s attorney may pressure their client not to file a second claim unless
the second claim significantly increases the likelihood or amount of a judgment or settlement. For both arrangements, these costs include the costs of
representing an employee in front of EEOC investigations and conciliation efforts. See The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
168. See, e.g., Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir.
1981).
169. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116–17 (2002)
(discussing the statutory scheme regarding review).
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III. AMELIORATING THE HARDSHIPS AND INEQUITY
CAUSED BY A STRICT READING OF TITLE VII TO
RETALIATION CLAIMS
In order to ensure the viability of retaliation claims, this
Note proposes adding the following language to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1): “An allegation of retaliation arising from the
prior filing of a charge under this section shall not require an
additional filing to, or review by, the Commission.” The narrow
purpose of this amendment is to exempt post-charge retaliation
claims from mandatory EEOC review. Doing so essentially
preempts a future Supreme Court from expanding its principles
in Morgan to post-charge retaliation claims. Ideally, the
amendment would return all the circuits to the way they treated post-charge retaliation before Morgan admonished them to
follow the strict text of Title VII.
Why is an amendment necessary? The other obvious solution would be to let the courts deal with the issue; after all, the
Fourth Circuit successfully minimized the holding of Morgan to
170
not affect a post-charge retaliatory act. However, two other
171
circuits have explicitly come down on the other side, and the
172
Supreme Court would have both its own precedent and a recent history of conservativeness towards statutory text in em173
ployment law to support a strict reading of Title VII. Further,
the Supreme Court will likely not have a chance to settle the
split in the near future, as the Court dismissed the petition for
174
certiorari pursuant to Rule 46 on March 1, 2013. Even it was
able to hear such a case, the current Court has proven itself
175
hostile to complainants under Title VII. With a second term
of President Obama, it is certainly possible that a new liberal
court could interpret Title VII in favor of a new plaintiff who is
170. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2009).
171. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam); Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2003).
172. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 101.
173. For an exploration of the Supreme Court’s recent conservative approach to Title VII, particularly concerning Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), see Kathryn A. Eidmann, Comment, Ledbetter in
Congress: The Limits of a Narrow Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971,
972–78 (2008).
174. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013) (mem.)
(dismissing petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
46.1). Rule 46.1 of the Supreme Court Rules allows parties to file an agreement to dismiss the case. SUP. CT. R. 46.1.
175. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
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similarly situated to Ms. Richter. However, trying to predict
the makeup of a future Supreme Court, let alone what their de176
cision on the issue would be, is conjectural at best. Instead of
hoping that a future Supreme Court will skirt around the language of Title VII, which the Court in Morgan admonished low177
er courts for doing, the better answer is to change the source
of the issue: the statutory text.
Some critics might argue that the solution is too narrow,
and that it solves only a small solution in the larger mess of
178
EEOC procedure. This often is based on the assertion that
the EEOC lacks resources for effective conciliation or litigation,
179
a claim often made by the EEOC itself. However, the two extreme solutions—either completely eliminating the EEOC’s
mandatory review or significantly increasing its funding—
would fundamentally alter the employment litigation process in
the United States. This note does not propose such radical solutions, and instead operates under the assumption that the
EEOC will continue to operate under its current level of authority. Alternatively, critics might argue that such a small
change to Title VII is not worth of Congressional time or attention. However, a change of similar scope was made in 2009 by

176. For a recent example, see the conservative reaction to Chief Justice
Roberts’ decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). See Caroline May, After Obamacare Ruling, Conservatives Turn on Chief Justice Roberts, DAILY CALLER (June 28, 2012, 4:34 PM),
http://dailycaller.com/2012/06/28/after-obamacare-ruling-conservatives-turn
-on-chief-justice-roberts (“Our Constitution is dead . . . and we can thank our
chief justice for that.” (quoting Young America’s Foundation spokesperson Ron
Meyer)).
177. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108 (2002)
(“While the lower courts have offered reasonable, albeit divergent, solutions,
none are compelled by the text of the statute. In the context of a request to alter the timely filing requirements of Title VII, this Court has stated that ‘strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the
best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.’” (quoting Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 907, 826 (1980))).
178. See, e.g., Eidmann, supra note 173, at 972, 978 (arguing that overly
specific amendments to certain parts of Title VII would hinder future discrimination claims and “promote future narrowing of the doctrine interpreting Title VII’s EEOC charge provision”).
179. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-712, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: PILOT PROJECTS COULD HELP TEST SOLUTIONS TO
LONG-STANDING CONCERNS WITH THE EEO COMPLAINT PROCESS 13 (2009)
(“Many EEO practitioners across the various practitioner groups identified a
lack of resources . . . as impeding the timely processing of federal EEO complaints.”).

802

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:775

180

the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. The Fair Pay Act of 2009
amended Title VII to allow the statute of limitations for an
equal pay lawsuit to renew each time a plaintiff is compensated
181
under the discriminatory scheme. It was enacted in direct response to the Supreme Court’s strict adherence to Title VII’s
182
text. Of course, Congress is more likely to enact legislation
because of a controversial Supreme Court decision than from a
seemingly innocuous circuit split. Nevertheless, President
Obama has shown that he supports employee’s rights in
amending Title VII, so another amendment could certainly be
enacted with effective lobbying or political pressure.
Other critics might dispute whether the EEOC needs to be
amended at all. After all, if Title VII is to retain the EEOC’s
mandatory review of all other charges except for retaliation,
critics would argue that there is nothing special about retaliation that should exempts it from the EEOC’s notice and conciliatory purposes. These critics would argue that conciliation and
183
184
notice play important and effective roles. However, while
conciliation efforts do remain an essential justification for the
185
very existence of a mandatory filing EEOC, it is harder to
180. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). Admittedly, the issue of equal pay of women is a much more politically charged issue
in the national discourse. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and
Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
951, 954 (2011) (discussing recent equal-pay lawsuits and highlighting some of
the public calls for reform).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2006).
182. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 2, 123 Stat. at 5 (“The Supreme Court
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly
impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that
Congress established . . . . The Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory
protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or
other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
183. Indeed, in many decisions that enforce the EEOC’s review and investigation powers, courts note the importance of the EEOC’s conciliatory efforts.
See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1509 (11th Cir.
1985) (“The courts concluded that the emphasis in Title VII on conciliation and
the legislative history of Title VII indicate that Congress intended Title VII to
be enforced primarily through conciliation and voluntary compliance.”).
184. In fiscal year 2011, the EEOC reported that it successfully settled and
conciliated 9.8 percent of all cases. See Litigation Statistics, supra note 41.
185. For a particularly scathing analysis of the EEOC’s role in employment
litigation, see Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII
Claims on “Jurisdictional” Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require
that Allegations Be Presented to an Agency Without the Resources to Consider
Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 213, 238–39 (“Thus, the
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justify the requirement of a second conciliation effort for the
sake of uniformity, especially when the first conciliation effort
186
so clearly failed.
While conciliation efforts should remain
necessary in Title VII litigation for most forms of discrimination, retaliation following an EEOC filing is a unique form of
discrimination, and Title VII must be amended to ensure that
employees are protected with a robust anti-retaliation clause.
CONCLUSION
Recent court decisions have significantly weakened the viability of retaliation claims under Title VII. Courts have struggled to find a balance between adhering to the strict language
of Title VII and upholding the goals and policies of the antidiscrimination statute. While requiring an aggrieved individual
to file an additional charge for retaliation ensures that the
EEOC has an opportunity to review and investigate all claims
arising under Title VII, it incentivizes employers to retaliate
against employees who file charges and discourages employees
from filing additional charges of retaliation. Unfortunately for
employees, such a strict adherence to the text of Title VII is a
proper reading of the statute and of Supreme Court precedent.
The damaging ramifications to an employee’s retaliation
claims, which are essential for Title VII’s success, necessitate a
statutory change. A statutory exception of post-charge retaliation from mandatory EEOC review would most effectively resolve this conflict. Without this statutory change, Title VII lays
another significant mine to the already complex procedural
minefield of employment discrimination litigation.

presentment requirement ignores the realities of Title VII enforcement. . . . Although the EEOC lacks the funds to enforce Title VII in the way it
was intended to and private plaintiffs are left to stand in its stead, private
plaintiffs, even those that have the resources which the EEOC lacks to investigate, are left more restricted than the agency whose role they are performing.”).
186. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
second filing was unnecessary because “conciliation with the [employer] did
not improve her position the first time and would be unlikely to do so a second
time”).

